The problem of climate nationalism

Michael Gove. Image: UK Government.

Flickr
The government’s recent approval of the proposal to open a new coking coal mine in West Cumbria is an example of such climate nationalism in action.

The logics used to justify continued fossil fuel combustion in one country are flawed because they fail to address it as a global issue.

Climate breakdown is a global problem, caused by excess greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, emitted primarily by the burning of fossilised carbon.

Arguably, the failure to make sufficient progress in moving away from such burning is now due not so much to climate denialism or even greenwash - rather, the culprit is climate nationalism.

Read: Cumbria mine 'is self harm'.

Climate nationalism can be defined as the view that the interests of one’s country outweigh those of the rest of the world.

Emissions

The recent case of Michael Gove's approval of the proposal to open a new coking coal mine in West Cumbria on behalf of the UK Government is an example of such climate nationalism in action.

The key conclusion in the government’s decision letter, agreeing entirely with the accompanying report by the planning inspector, is that the development "would have a broadly neutral effect on the global release of greenhouse gases from coal used in steel making, whether or not end use emissions are taken into account".

This will strike many, if not most, people as very odd, given that it is accepted that total greenhouse gas emissions resulting from the coal mine, including end use emissions, are likely to amount to 8.8 million tonnes a year, or 220 million tonnes over 25 years.

However, what the inspector’s report essentially argues is that the global total of coking coal for steel making and the resulting global total of greenhouse gas emissions will remain more or less the same because whatever the proposed new mine does will be counterbalanced by reductions in both coking coal production and resulting emissions from such production associated with other mines across the world.

This counterbalancing is called ‘substitution’.

Outweighing

The report tries to show that such substitution will occur, referring to "swing suppliers" in the USA who will switch off their supply of coking coal in response to the new supply from West Cumbria, so that the latter will substitute for coal currently imported into England from the USA.

What is lacking, however, is actual evidence that such substitution will occur. And even if it does, the US mining companies may switch at least some of their export to other countries rather than reduce their supply.

It also seems to be accepted that most of the coal extracted by the proposed mine itself will be exported to other countries.

Unless this coal is cheaper than that of its competitors, it seems unlikely that it would substitute for coal produced by these competitors. So it can be granted that some substitution could occur but 100 per cent substitution has not been demonstrated at all, and seems unlikely.

The logics used to justify continued fossil fuel combustion in one country are flawed because they fail to address it as a global issue.

So, if the case for approving the mine is clearly flawed, why has the government accepted it? The key point here is that this mine serves a national interest, outweighing both global and local concerns.

Supply

No evidence has been cited to show that a majority of the local population support the proposal.

The national interest is identified variously, in terms of preferring UK-produced coal to imported coal, supporting the UK steel industry, providing jobs for UK citizens, and in general backing UK enterprise in competition with foreign companies.

Even the government’s net zero by 2050 target is held up as a world leader in comparison with other countries.

Thus, the mine is to be approved because it will be net zero by 2049, which is alleged to be better than any other coal mine in the world.

In addition other coking coal mines are expected to reduce their supply in order to allow for overall global supply to remain the same.

Logics

The UK will be less reliant on imported coal because it will be producing more of its own. This all seems good for the country, hence the government’s approval.

From this climate nationalist point of view, the fact that most of the coal will be exported is seen not as a problem but as a bonus because it is believed to enrich the UK and transfer the burden of emissions reduction to other countries.

The problem with climate nationalism in this case - as in many others including the licensing of gas and oil exploration and extraction in the North Sea - is that climate change is a global phenomenon.

The logics used to justify continued fossil fuel combustion in one country are flawed because they fail to address it as a global issue.

Detail is lacking on what other countries might do if and when the West Cumbria mine opens because climate nationalists do not concern themselves with such detail, being content simply to assume that appropriate substitution will occur.

Dogged

Ironically, this failure to give serious consideration to the global market is self-defeating because the mine’s survival will depend heavily on being able to export its coal abroad, and this will become increasingly difficult as the steel industry decarbonises and the world moves away from fossil fuels.

In the meantime, the UK’s total greenhouse gas emissions, rather than being reduced as required by a combination of law, national commitment and policy, will increase substantially, at least in the short-to-medium term.

This will exacerbate climate change globally, and the harmful effects of this will inevitably rebound on the UK. The governmental approval of this mine therefore risks becoming a symptom of a wider decline of the UK as a whole.

Arguably, this is the same problem as that which has dogged Brexit more generally, namely an over-emphasis on the separateness of the UK can result in a preoccupation with controlling its boundaries, and risks failing to engage effectively with global issues.

This Author

Peter Somerville is emeritus professor of social policy at the University of Lincoln.

More from this author